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Abstract

The importance of board committees – specialized subgroups that exist to perform many of the board's most
critical functions, such as setting executive compensation, identifying potential board members, and overseeing
financial reporting – has grown over time due to increased legal requirements and greater complexity of the
environment in which firms operate. This has resulted in a large body of work examining board committees
across the accounting, finance, and management disciplines. However, this research has developed rather
independently within each discipline, preventing scholars and practitioners from developing a comprehensive

understanding of board committees. To address this issue, we conduct a comprehensive review of the literature
that: 1) summarizes and synthesizes antecedents and outcomes associated with board committees in publicly‐
traded firms in English common law countries; and 2) offers a critical analysis of existing research, providing
recommendations for advancements and new directions in board committee research.

Introduction
Boards of directors are an integral part of a firm's governance system; monitoring and advising management
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and providing access to resources for firm adaptation (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003;
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Not surprisingly, prior research places substantial attention on understanding what
makes boards effective, including their composition, leadership structure, decision processes, and dynamics
(Dalton et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2013; Krause et al., 2013; Withers et al., 2012). While these studies inform
our understanding of the entire board, it is the specialized subgroups – the board's committees – that exist to
manage details associated with its most critical functions, such as setting executive compensation, identifying
new members, and overseeing financial reporting.
Findings on the relationship between board structural characteristics and firm performance have been
inconclusive (e.g., Dalton et al., 1998, 2003; Johnson et al., 2013). Additionally, boards have been criticized for
failing to perform their fiduciary duties due to limited knowledge of firm intricacies, coordination and cohesion
issues among directors, and social loafing among board members (Boivie et al., 2016). This has led some scholars
to focus on board committees as the potential source for solving the inherent deficiencies of the full corporate
board. Prior research has identified important features of committees that allow them to more diligently and
comprehensively monitor and advise firm executives and thus contribute to firm outcomes. In particular, by
being smaller, meeting more frequently, and drawing on the specialized expertise and abilities of their
members, board committees can execute tasks with greater efficiency and expediency (Kesner, 1988). In
addition, due to their well‐defined purpose and clear expectations, it is suggested that board committees face
greater scrutiny from various stakeholders, which reduces individual free‐riding and encourages more effective
implementation of their duties (Chen and Wu, 2016; Klein, 2002a).
The importance of board committees has grown over time due to increased legal requirements and growing
complexity of the business environment. Significantly greater demands are placed on board members’ time and
attention, as evidenced by a nearly 50 per cent increase in committees’ activities and meetings across S&P 1500
firms over the last 15 years (Adams et al., 2015). A long‐established precept in organization theory is that firms
develop specialized structures to handle complexity (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). For example, the multitude of
transactions in which executives engage makes overseeing their activities more difficult, requiring the board to
devise, approve and implement more intricate compensation contracts. Specialized committees, such as the
compensation committee, enable boards to handle this complexity through subgroup‐focused responsibility and
expertise, while also limiting the demands placed on individual directors. Therefore, the specialized expertise of
board committees is critical to the board's ability to reach effective decisions and fulfil its fiduciary duties.
However, the nature of committees and their specialized focus is likely to lead to dynamics substantively
different from those of the full board and may also create potential problems for both firm governance and
adaptation to changing circumstances. Appointment to a major board committee represents higher status and
importance for any director (Zhu et al., 2014). Status differences may be associated with greater director power.
Hence, committees may represent a greater power nexus within the overall board of directors. Because board
committees are smaller than the overall board, power is vested in a small number of directors for managing the
specific issues within a committee's domain. While research on boards of directors overall suggests that smaller
groups of directors will act more quickly (Goodstein et al., 1994), smaller groups are less likely to have a diversity
of perspectives. Thus, if important board committees, such as the nominating committee, are dominated by a

smaller, homogenous group of directors, the resource dependence role of the board (e.g., Hillman and
Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) could be compromised by a misalignment of firm resource needs with
director capabilities and social capital. Thus, the vesting of certain board powers in a smaller subset of directors
has the potential to both facilitate and impede the effectiveness of the board.
As a result, research focused on board committee composition, dynamics, and impact on organizational
outcomes is growing, particularly in the disciplines of accounting, finance, and management. This is illustrated in
Table 1, which highlights the dramatic increase in studies examining board committees since 2001. However,
board committee research has generally developed independently within these disciplines and the rich insights
from each have remained confined to their respective fields. Additionally, due to substantial changes in
governance, study samples and research questions prior to 2001 may not reflect recent governance practices.
The lack of a systematic and integrative review of the literature prevents scholars and practitioners from
developing a comprehensive understanding of what we know, don't know, and should know about board
committees. To address this gap, we conduct a multidisciplinary review of board committee research, which
aims to provide several contributions. First, we offer a summary of existing management, finance and
accounting research on board committees and synthesize the main findings. In doing so, we outline and assess
the main antecedents of board committees and the key outcomes that board committees influence. Second, we
identify weaknesses and gaps in prior research that have prevented a more detailed understanding of board
committees. In particular, we posit that our understanding of how committees operate is rather limited because
scholars have extensively relied on committee structural characteristics. Instead, we suggest that a greater focus
on social and human capital of committee members, for example, may further enhance our understanding of
how committees operate in today's governance environment. Lastly, we focus on several underexplored areas
and offer recommendations for moving board committee research forward in a manner more tightly integrated
within the broader field of corporate governance.

Table 1. Studies examining board committees (from this literature review) by year
Year

Before 1990
1990 to 1995
1996 to 2000
2001 to 2005
2006 to 2010
2011 to 2015
2016 to 2018

Studies
5
4
16
32
40
39
6

Our paper is organized as follows. First, we outline and define key board committees and their roles. Second, we
detail our review criteria and categorize our review of antecedents and outcomes of board committees. Based
on our findings from reviewing existing research, we then identify opportunities for future research to advance
and expand our understanding of board committees’ role in corporate governance.

Review of the Board Committee Literature
Board Committees Defined

Board committees exist for distinct purposes and are subgroups of directors currently sitting on a corporation's
board. Table 2 outlines the purpose, composition requirements and typical functions of the three most common
board committees for public firms in English common law countries, such as the United States, the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia: audit, compensation, and nominating/governance committees.1

Table 2. Requirements and responsibilities of board committees in public firms
Committee
Audit
Required: USA
Required of large
firms: UK, Canada and
Australia

Membership
requirements*
Independent outside
directors, one member
must be a financial
expert.

Purpose
Oversee financial
reporting and
disclosure.

Typical functions

Hire, manage and, if necessary,
change auditor.
Oversee financial reporting and
accounting.
Acquire other resources and
expertise necessary for financial
reporting and disclosure.
Monitor the effectiveness of
internal audit and management
controls.
Monitor corporate governance,
regulatory compliance, and risk
management.
Compensation
Independent outside
Recommend to the
Determine the terms of
Required: USA
directors.
board compensation
engagement and compensation
Required of large
structures of
for the CEO and other senior
firms: Australia
executives and board
executives.
Comply or Explain: UK
members.
Oversee stock option packages
and Canada**
and understand their effect on
overall compensation.
Operate long term,
performance‐related pay plans
for executives.
Nominating /
Fully independent
Seek and recommend Find candidates with proper
Governance
outside directors
new board members.
credentials that can also work
(NYSE), majority of
with current board chairman and
Required: USA
members.
Comply or Explain: UK, independent directors
(NASDAQ).
Canada and Australia
Assess each director's
performance, including meeting
attendance and impact of other
directorships.
Make recommendations on re‐
election.
Recommend board members for
committee memberships.
Other non‐required
None
Varies
Functions are specific to the
committees (e.g.,
charter of the non‐required
Executive, Strategy,
committee.
Finance,
Often associated with focus on a
Environmental,
specific problem and / or
signaling commitment to
CSR)
concerns of shareholders and
other external stakeholders.
Sources: Calkoen (2017), Chen and Wu (2016), Laux and Laux (2009), Tricker (2015), Withers et al. (2012)
* USA member requirements are stated. UK, Canada and Australia have similar but not identical requirements.

** Comply or explain means committee existence or composition is strongly recommended by governance
codes for firms. Deviations from board committee recommendations (i.e., non‐compliance) must be explained in
public securities filings.
In the Unites States, certain committees have become required by law or stock exchange rules in the last several
decades. For example, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter referred to as SOX) required all US‐based
publicly‐traded firms to have an audit committee. Later, the two main US stock exchanges (NYSE and NASDAQ)
enacted requirements that all listed firms’ boards have compensation and nominating committees. Because
countries with institutions based in common law tend to have strong property rights and investor protections,
the major stock exchanges in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom now require, at least for large firms, the
existence of audit committees (Calkoen, 2017; Tricker, 2015). Relatedly, governance codes in these countries
strongly recommend that large public firms have compensation and nominating committees whereby firms
must file yearly governance documents that either attest to the existence of these committees or explain why
the firm does not need the committee (i.e., this is commonly referred to as the ‘comply or explain’ rule in the
UK). In practice, large public firms in the UK tend to comply with the governance code. Indeed, 90 per cent of
FTSE 350 firms have both compensation and nominating committees (Calkoen, 2017). Compliance also tends to
be very high in Canada and Australia for large firms.2
Firms’ boards may also have additional committees specifically focused on areas such as strategic planning, the
environment, or corporate social responsibility (CSR) that are not required by law but may reflect firm strategy,
industry norms or a board's response to an issue or event. Boards continue to add committees, with over 75 per
cent of S&P 500 firms having at least one committee beyond those required and 41 per cent having at least two
additional committees as of 2016 (Ernst and Young Center for Board Matters, 2018).

Method for Identifying Board Committee Studies

Following a process similar to previous highly‐cited high quality reviews (see Haleblian et al., 2009), we executed
five steps to control our review's scope and ensure that our coverage of relevant studies was logical and
comprehensive. First, we focused on quantitative, empirical research of board committees in the accounting,
finance and management literatures. Second, given space limitations and the substantial volume of board
committee research, we limited our review to articles that had been published in leading journals or were
among the 100 most relevant published articles for each keyword in an electronic keyword search (to be
described shortly). The number of articles included in our literature review tables from each journal, along with
abbreviations for the journal titles, are shown in Appendix I. Third, due to significant variations in regulations
and corporate governance across countries (Donaldson and Davis, 1994; Tricker, 2015), we only included studies
of board committees for firms in the US, UK, Canada and Australia. As discussed previously, such countries have
strong investor protections and have been at the forefront of the board committee movement. Other countries,
such as Germany, have two‐tiered boards, while some have weak director independence rules, and emerging
economies still have developing corporate governance regimes (Aguilera, 2005). As such, our selected studies
represent economies where the board committee paradigm is the most developed, with the three main
committees either required or heavily emphasized by legal or institutional requirements, especially for large
firms.
Within the constraints of the first three steps, in our fourth step we used Google Scholar to search for
keywords: board committee, subcommittee, audit committee, nominating committee, and compensation
committee. This process yielded over 700 articles. Fifth, each article was reviewed to determine if it was relevant
for this review. Many articles were eliminated because they did not specifically operationalize influences from or
facets of one or more board committees, such as existence, composition, function, behaviour, or outcomes.
Additionally, similar to previous reviews of board research (see Johnson et al., 2013), studies that examined not‐

for‐profit boards were eliminated. Subsequently, our review process identified 142 articles for inclusion; 57 from
management, 42 from finance, and 43 from accounting journals. Of the 142 articles, 83 examined audit
committees, 59 studied compensation committees and 39 focused on nominating/governance committees.
Other committees examined include: environmental (6 studies), executive (4), public affairs (2), CSR (2), and
strategic planning (2). Committees relating to public policy, ethics, finance, or technology were each explored in
one study.
After identifying the 142 articles, we then coded and categorized the articles. Primary variables and key findings
were coded, enabling each article to first be placed into one of three categories: antecedents of board
committees, outcomes associated with board committees, and non‐required committees. Each article was then
further grouped by its major topic within those three categories (e.g., executive compensation as an outcome).
Thus, we report the 142 articles in seven literature review tables. Within each table, we then further sub‐
categorized the articles by the focal topic of the study (e.g., committee composition for studies examining
executive compensation). We also tried to identify the major theoretical frame used in the article. We were
conservative in identifying the theoretical framework and only labelled it for a study in the tables if the authors
clearly stated their theoretical background. As will be seen in the tables, some studies lack a theoretical frame as
the authors took a more phenomenological focused approach in their study. The results from categorizing the
articles are illustrated in Figure 1 and form the basis for the following discussions of the antecedents and
outcomes of board committees.

Figure 1 Overview of board committee research

Antecedents of Board Committees 3

A major research area has been the antecedents of board committees. Studies in this area examine questions
such as: Why does the committee exist? What factors affect committee composition and independence? What
factors influence committee practices (e.g., frequency of meetings)? Below, we discuss the following
antecedents emphasized in prior research: legal requirements and institutional pressures, governance
characteristics, director human capital and interlocks, director demography, and CEO behaviour (see Table 3).

Legal requirements and institutional pressure

A major driver of committee composition has been the mandatory legal requirements for greater diligence by
committee members. In the US, SOX was the major catalyst for increased committee independence (i.e.,
reducing the number of insiders or affiliated directors), as audit, nominating and compensation committee
independence rose to 92 per cent or more between 1998 and 2005 (Duchin et al., 2010).4 SOX has also
encouraged more frequent meetings of audit and nominating committees, discouraged CEO membership on the
nominating committee, and led to greater director turnover, especially for audit committee members, whose
annual departure rate increased by over four per cent between 2001 and 2004 (Linck et al., 2008; Valenti, 2008).
Stakeholder pressure also has increased committees’ monitoring capabilities. For example, Cheng et al. (2010)
show that when an institutional investor is a lead plaintiff in a lawsuit against a firm, the firm's audit committee

independence improves by over four per cent two years after the lawsuit was filed. Similarly, the existence of
activist campaigns, such as ‘just vote no’ campaigns designed to withhold votes toward the election of directors,
has encouraged firms to remove the CEO from the compensation committee (Del Guercio et al., 2008).
Violation of legal requirements and established institutional norms, such as involvement in questionable
activities, has been commonly examined as an antecedent to committee membership and composition. For
example, Arthaud‐Day et al. (2006) find that following financial restatements, audit committees face a 70 per
cent increase in the likelihood of member turnover. Similarly, Srinivasan (2005) provides evidence that
restatements for at least five quarters increase the likelihood of audit committee member removal by 10 per
cent. Relatedly, when stock option backdating scandals occur, compensation and audit committee members are
penalized by receiving fewer re‐election votes and are more likely to step down (Ertimur et al., 2012). For
instance, compensation committee members during the backdating period received 10 per cent fewer re‐
election votes compared to a two to three per cent penalty for other directors. Since such violations undermine
a firm's legitimacy, the firm undertakes aggressive efforts to disassociate itself from the guilty actors and restore
its credibility among stakeholders (Suchman, 1995). As a result, severe penalties accrue to committee members
who are tasked with, but fail to ensure, compliance to existing norms and regulations.

Governance characteristics

Another important committee antecedent is the quality of the firm's governance. Anderson and Reeb (2004), for
instance, found that power wielded by founding‐family members influenced nominating committee
membership and, subsequently, board membership. Firms with weaker governance arrangements, such as the
presence of overly sympathetic (i.e., cheerleader) directors, had, on average, 29 per cent fewer independent
nominating committee members (Cohen et al., 2012). Similarly, weak governance systems have been associated
with common membership among compensation and audit committees (Liao and Hsu, 2013). In contrast,
strong‐governance firms – those with more independent and active boards – are more likely to voluntarily form
a governance committee (Huang et al., 2009).

Director human capital and interlocks

Many studies have used a human capital lens to examine how directors’ characteristics impact their
membership on, and overall composition of, various committees. Viewing multiple directorships as evidence of a
director's quality (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983), Masulis and Mobbs (2014) found that directors who sit on
multiple boards are more likely to obtain additional committee memberships and chair a major committee.
Those arguments are confirmed by Field et al. (2013), who provide evidence that busy directors (i.e., those
sitting on three or more boards) have greater experience, qualifications and network connections, increasing
their chances of serving on audit and nominating committees by 20 and 40 per cent, respectively. Kesner (1988)
shows that characteristics indicating director competence and expertise in setting and overseeing the
implementation of firm strategies, such as being an outsider, having business‐related functional experience and
serving longer on the board, are positively related to major committee membership. Similarly, Boivie et al.
(2012) provide evidence that audit committee chairs are 29 per cent less likely to exit the firm, suggesting that
firms take steps to retain the knowledge and experience associated with committees leaders.

Director demography

An emphasis in research on director demography has been the inclusion of female directors on board
committees. Studies point to the existence of bias against female directors, suggesting little has changed from
earlier findings that posit ‘women are not window dressing but do not hold important positions on the boards of
large corporations’ (Kesner, 1988, p. 80). For example, after controlling for directors’ experience, scholars have
found that women are less likely to be appointed to committees responsible for key governance functions of US
firms (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Peterson and Philpot, 2007). Conyon and Mallin (1997) found a similar bias

against women being appointed to key committees in UK firms, with women comprising only 2.49 per cent of
board memberships in FTSE350 firms and only half of female directors serving on major committees. These
findings suggest that there is a continued prevalence of deeply held stereotypes against female board members,
as evidenced by women having career experience valuable to the board but perceived as lacking the experience
necessary to serve on key committees (Heilman et al., 1989; Hillman et al., 2002).
In a different vein, Zhu et al. (2014) find that directors who are similar to other directors along certain
demographic characteristics are more likely to be accepted as both members and chairs of major board
committees. While these studies inform our understanding of committee composition, further exploration is
needed. Specifically, examining if and how age, racial and functional background diversity are associated with
the composition and effectiveness of board committees may increase our understanding of committee
membership and function, as well as the degree to which boards embrace diversity. Additionally, as prior
research has found that a firm's links to other firms with female directors is positively related to female board
members (Hillman et al., 2007), extending this research to the committee level may offer a greater
understanding of the causes and degree of bias against female and other minority directors.

CEO behavior

The ways in which CEOs influence committee formation have also been examined. Westphal and Bednar (2008)
showed that CEOs’ use of ingratiating behaviour and persuasion towards representatives of institutional
investors helped prevent the formation of an independent nominating committee. Jones et al. (2015) offer
empirical support for the argument that powerful CEOs are more likely to avoid or defy the adoption of a
governance committee; a 20 per cent increase in CEO power relative to the board was associated with a 60 per
cent decrease in adoption of a governance committee. While such power for CEOs is restricted to some degree
by legal requirements, it still plays an important role in new director nomination and committee formation.
Further research is encouraged to help understand how CEOs influence committee formation and composition,
as well as new research that examines how power is developed and wielded within committees and in their
interaction with CEOs.

Outcomes of Board Committees

An extensive body of research has examined the outcomes of board committees, seeking to explain how board
committees’ existence, independence, composition and turnover influence important outcomes, including firm
performance and value, executive compensation, financial misconduct and inappropriate behaviour, and
accounting practices. It is important to acknowledge that while board committees might be instrumental in
affecting the above outcomes, the full board also impacts those outcomes by ratifying committee decisions,
although the extent to which authority is held and exercised at the board or committee level is largely unknown
(see Tables 4-9).

Firm performance and value

A substantial volume of prior research has focused on how committee independence influences firm
performance. Drawing on agency theory logic (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), scholars have argued that
committee independence is critical for protecting shareholders’ interests because it allows for objective
assessment of firm strategies and constrains CEO opportunistic behaviour. Research on audit committee
independence generally finds a positive relationship between independence and performance. For example,
Aggarwal and colleagues in two studies found a positive impact from audit committee independence on firm
value and market return (Aggarwal et al., 2008, 2011). Relatedly, the presence of expert independent audit
committee members positively influences firm performance (Chan and Li, 2008), and the market positively
receives announcements of financial experts joining audit committees (Davidson et al., 2004; DeFond et
al., 2005). Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) further illustrate the focus on and importance of committee member

independence by showing that the death of an independent audit committee member is associated with a two
per cent abnormal drop in stock price. Notably, however, Klein (2002b) reported a negative association between
audit committee independence and financial performance.
Somewhat contrarily, studies examining the effects of nominating and compensation committee independence
on firm performance have produced rather ambiguous results. Some studies report that when these two
committees are independent, firms exhibit higher performance (Grove et al., 2011; Hoechle et al., 2012) and are
more likely to avoid bankruptcy (Platt and Platt, 2012). Yet, other studies find a positive relationship between
insiders on the nominating committee and market return, suggesting the importance of management
participation in director selection (e.g., Callahan et al., 2003). In particular, Klein (1998) provides evidence that a
more independent compensation committee results in lower productivity from the firm's long‐term assets.
Similarly, Faleye (2007) found nominating committee independence was associated with a 12 to 14 per cent
lower market return. The equivocal pattern of findings for nominating and compensation committees suggests
that committee independence may have positive benefits for some firms, while imposing burdens on others.
However, these equivocal results may also be driven by reliance on datasets from different eras. In addition, the
mixed results across different committee types should serve as caution against claims that independence is the
panacea for reducing agency costs when examining the monitoring function of board committees.
Beyond the effects of committee independence, prior research also provides evidence regarding committees’
attention to their tasks and firm performance. Falato et al. (2014) found that a busy director who serves on
another board in which that firm incurs the death of the CEO or board member was associated with a 1.37 per
cent decrease in stock price, while Dey (2008) found that an effective audit committee (e.g., fully independent,
meets more often, has a financial expert) increases financial return for all levels of agency conflicts. No
relationship has been found for committee gender and racial diversity with firm performance (Carter et
al., 2010).

Executive compensation

As with firm performance, most studies have utilized agency theory to investigate relationships between
committee characteristics and oversight of executive compensation. Consistent with agency theory, some
studies find that strong committee governance constrains managerial attempts to capture larger and potentially
unmerited financial compensation. For example, blockholders sitting on the compensation committee has been
found to be associated with decreases in total CEO compensation and increases in equity incentives (Conyon
and He, 2004). Similarly, Cyert et al. (2002) report that doubling compensation committee members’ stock
ownership results in about a four per cent reduction in predicted CEO contingent compensation and about a five
per cent reduction in predicted CEO equity compensation, while Sun and Cahan (2009) show that CEO cash
compensation is more tightly linked to accounting earnings for compensation committees with higher quality.6
Committee member independence has also been a point of emphasis in studies of compensation committees in
non‐US firms, with studies finding that independence positively moderates the relationships of non‐proxy‐based
activism, involving verbal steps taken by activist shareholders (e.g., statements to the media), with Canadian
CEO contingent compensation (Chowdhury and Wang, 2009) and U.K. top management pay with firm
performance (Conyon and Peck, 1998). In contrast, the absence of diligent committee monitoring allows CEOs to
extract greater pay. For example, CEOs enjoy bonuses relative to merger deal sizes that are approximately 100
per cent greater when they sit on the nominating committee (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004), and approximately 30
per cent greater total compensation when audit committee members are linked to, and socially dependent on,
the CEO (Hwang and Kim, 2009). In line with those findings, Stathopolous et al. (2004) provide evidence that
total pay for UK CEOs, via issuance of in‐the‐money stock options, increases when they sit on the compensation
committee.

However, some research offers findings which do not support agency theory arguments. Chhaochharia and
Grinstein (2009) fail to find evidence that compensation and nominating committee independence are related
to CEO compensation. Moreover, Guthrie et al. (2012) found that two outliers in Chhaochharia and Grinstein's
study (Apple and Fossil) biased their study and, after accounting for outliers, find that requirements for
compensation committee independence lead to increases in US CEO total pay; findings consistent with those of
Masulis et al. (2012) who report a positive relationship between foreign independent directors on the
compensation committee and CEO pay. Finally, the presence of ‘captured’ board members on the compensation
committee was found to not be associated with greater changes in CEO compensation and total CEO
compensation (Daily et al., 1998). Captured board members are directors who are affiliated with the firm (i.e.,
personal or professional relationships with the firm or its executives) or are interdependent (i.e., appointed after
the CEO started in his or her position). Such findings that conflict with agency theory arguments suggest that
directors serving on powerful committees, regardless of whether they are independent, may prioritize their
obligation to shareholders (Daily, 1996; Daily et al., 1998) or that an optimal contracting perspective, in which
higher CEO compensation reflects the market price for greater managerial quality, supersedes agency theory in
some contexts (Masulis et al., 2012).
Overall, our review of compensation committee influence reveals support for agency theory predictions of CEO
compensation is rather mixed. This is likely why scholars use other theoretical frameworks with agency theory.
In particular, recent work argues that committees’ monitoring can be enhanced when members have sufficient
knowledge and expertise. Building theory on knowledge transfer and exchange, Brandes et al. (2016) examined
how linking ‘pin’ directors (i.e., directors serving on the audit and compensation committees) are associated
with reduced CEO compensation. In a study focusing on other top executives, Gore et al. (2011) find support for
the presence of a finance committee or a CEO with a financial background leading to lower incentive‐based pay
for the chief financial officer, arguing that this supported relationship is evidence that financial expertise is an
important component of effective monitoring.
Moving away from agency theory, scholars have attempted to provide alternative explanations of how and why
board committees impact executive compensation. Young and Buchholtz (2002) employ social identity theory
and the similarity‐attraction paradigm to argue that CEOs are treated more favourably when they are
demographically similar to the compensation committee. The authors find that CEO pay is more closely tied to
firm performance when compensation committee members’ tenure is more dissimilar to the CEO's tenure.
Belliveau et al. (1996) also examine similarity, but focus on social status differences between CEOs and their
compensation committee chairs. Consistent with the position that social status affects influence and
dependence among individuals, the study indicates that a CEO with higher relative social status than the
compensation committee chair receives greater compensation. Alternatively, a compensation committee chair
with higher social status than the CEO constrains CEO pay.
A nascent, but growing research stream focuses on the effects of CEO and compensation committee members’
political beliefs on compensation. Using political psychology and upper echelon perspectives, Gupta and Wowak
(2017) found that politically conservative compensation committees, in which their members have donated
more often, over a longer period of time and in greater amounts to the Republican party in the US, were
positively associated with total CEO pay and greater rewards for strong financial performance. On the other
hand, Chin and Semadeni (2017) found that politically liberal CEOs and compensation committees, who
prioritize both egalitarianism and equality, are associated with greater pay equality among non‐CEO executives.
These two studies are examples of how established management theory can be integrated with social constructs
to offer new and relevant insights into corporate governance.
Finally, research has examined the criteria compensation committees use to determine executive compensation.
In their test of which of two theories better explain CEO compensation, O'Reilly et al. (1988) found no support

for a tournament theory argument in which CEO pay is greater when a firm has more vice presidents. However,
the authors found support for a model developed from social comparisons and suggested this finding indicates
that compensation committee members’ judgments on CEO pay are anchored by their own pay. Relatedly,
scholars have argued that compensation committees may consider the regulatory environment (Perry and
Zenner, 2001), anticipated market rates (Ezzamel and Watson, 2002), and compensation across unrelated firms
(Faulkender and Yang, 2010) to determine CEO pay at their own firms.

Misconduct and inappropriate behaviour

Common types of questionable firm behaviour include earnings management, fraud/crime, and stock option
manipulation. While financial reporting requires judgment, firms have techniques to create unjustifiably positive
views of earnings, such as taking abnormal accruals. Research, however, has consistently shown that stronger
monitoring by committees, measured as having a majority of independent directors serving on at least two of
the three major committees, reduces abnormal accruals7 (Faleye et al., 2011). For example, Klein (2002a) found
that audit committee independence was negatively associated with abnormal accruals. Badolato et al. (2014)
examined audit committees’ status (i.e., career advancement, achievement and prestige) relative to
management and financial expertise, finding that both were positively associated with lower abnormal accruals
and reduced accounting irregularities. Bedard et al. (2004) had similar findings, but also found that excluding
audit committee members from receiving stock options reduced aggressive earnings management. Additionally,
Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2013) considered social network ties from friendships and advice networks between
audit committee members and CEOs, finding that friendship ties were positively associated with earnings
management, as well as auditors reporting internal control weaknesses and going‐concerns. Finally, audit
committee independence and legal expertise have been found to enhance the quality of financial reporting and
reduce the likelihood of restatement (Abbott et al., 2004; Krishnan et al., 2011).
In a study of firms committing white collar crime, Schnatterly (2003) found that actions associated with strong
governance (i.e., audit committee independence, more frequent meetings) did not impact the likelihood of a
first criminal event but did impact the likelihood of subsequent criminal activity. Uzun et al. (2004) reported
similar findings, but their study further suggested that the percentage of grey directors (i.e., outside directors
having some non‐board affiliation with the firm) on major committees was positively associated with fraud.
Interestingly, while studies of fraud remain common today, we identified no committee studies in which crime is
operationalized as criminal charges against firms following the 2002 passage of SOX in the US.
The manipulation of stock option pricing is another behaviour that has received attention. Bebchuk et al. (2010)
examined the opportunistic granting of stock options and found the existence of an independent compensation
committee did not influence opportunistic stock option grants, but the presence of a large blockholder on an
independent compensation committee reduced opportunistic grant timing by 71 per cent. Blockholders on the
compensation committee, as well as an outsider as compensation committee chair, were also negatively
associated with the likelihood of stock option repricing (Callaghan et al., 2004). However, directors serving on
the compensation and nominating committee profited more from buying and selling their firm's stock than
directors serving on the audit or other committees (Cao et al., 2014), suggesting information asymmetries may
exist even among directors on the same board.
Overall, our review of prior work revealed that greater expertise and stronger diligence at the committee level,
especially in the audit committee, are appropriate mechanisms for preventing or reducing managerial
misconduct. However, we were surprised that little attention has been paid to committee member misconduct
and how board committees restore trust following fraud and other types of inappropriate behaviour. Farber's
(2005) results suggest that firms recovering from fraud have more frequent audit committee meetings, while
Chan et al. (2012) found that audit committee size was positively associated with adopting clawback provisions

(i.e., compensation recovery provisions that allow the firm to recoup compensation from its executives involved
in accounting improprieties). Yet, no research was identified that examined changes in nominating or
compensation committee membership or function when firms were attempting to recover from trust violations.

Accounting practices

Research primarily from the accounting field has also examined how audit committee diligence and quality
impact accounting practices. For example, financial reporting quality, measured as fewer restatements and
discretionary accruals, was improved by the audit committee having greater legal and accounting expertise
(Krishnan et al., 2011), as well as a greater number of accounting and industry experts (Cohen et al., 2013).
Similarly, fully independent and active audit committees were associated with a reduced likelihood of
restatements and larger recognition of loan loss provisions (Abbott et al., 2004; Leventis et al., 2013). Indeed, in
pre‐IPO firms the mere presence of an audit committee can reduce accruals (Venkataraman et al., 2008). Finally,
effective audit committees help managers make more accurate earnings forecasts that result in positive market
reactions (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005).

Other firm‐level outcomes

The relationship of committee composition with other firm outcomes has also received attention. Gomulya and
Boeker (2016) studied CEO replacement following a financial restatement and found a positive relationship
between replacing an audit committee member and the likelihood of CEO replacement, suggesting that multiple
actors could receive blame for financial misconduct. In addition, Zhang (2008) found that the likelihood of a new
CEO's dismissal was reduced by the presence of an independent nominating committee when the CEO was
hired, and further reduced when nominating committee members had fewer other directorships. Guo and
Masulis (2015) found that nominating committee independence resulted in more effective CEO monitoring and
discipline. In line with those findings, Anderson et al. (2004) reported that firms with larger and independent
audit committees have lower costs of debt financing (i.e., they obtain debt more cheaply). Further, research has
indicated that greater committee independence can limit firm involvement in value‐decreasing acquisitions
(Faleye et al., 2011; Fracassi and Tate, 2012). Indeed, the relationship of major board committee independence
with outcomes such as leadership, structural change and more effective financing provides strong support for
the beneficial role of independence for major board committees. Comparing these results with the equivocal
findings on the link between board committee independence and firm performance suggests that performance
may be less controllable by board committees than more proximal drivers of performance.

Less traditional committees

A small number of studies examined the function and outcomes of other less traditional committees which have
yielded valuable insights into firms’ priorities and actions. The presence of a strategic planning committee was
found to be related to executives participation in strategic planning (Henke, 1986) and a lesser likelihood of
focusing on short‐term financial outcomes at the expense of long‐term initiatives (Beekun et al., 1998). The
presence of an environmental committee was found to increase transparency related to environmental issues
(Peters and Romi, 2014), improve a firm's environmental performance (Walls et al., 2012), and reduce industry
fines (Davidson and Worrell, 2001). While these studies provide insights regarding the presence and actions of
less common committees, further research examining the roles and impact of such committees is needed. Firms
and their boards may be pre‐dispositioned to prioritize certain issues (e.g., strategic planning, environmental)
and, thus, the presence of a committee may only be a related outcome. Additionally, external stakeholders,
analysts and media may emphasize that specific domains require firm attention following a reputation damaging
event (e.g., environmental violation), resulting in a committee being formed that may or may not have the
necessary intentions and discretion to prioritize actions over other firm initiatives. Studies examining the actions
and outcomes of firms adding such committees following poor performance in the associated domain may yield

valuable insights into how such committees affect executive behavior, stakeholder perceptions of the firm, and
firm outcomes.

Cross‐Disciplinary Comparison

One advantage of a cross‐disciplinary approach to reviewing board committee research is capturing a sizeable
breadth of the literature, as well as differences in theoretical and empirical specifications. As noted previously,
committee research has accumulated in isolation across the management, finance and accounting disciplines.
However, one similarity across disciplines is the relative dominance of agency theory as a theoretical framework
(see Tables 4 through 9).

Table 3. Antecedents of board committee existence and characteristics
Authors, Year;
Journal
Legal requirements
and institutional
pressure
Armstrong, Core,
and Guay, 2014;
JFE
Arthaud‐Day,
Certo, Dalton, and
Dalton, 2006; AMJ

Theoretical
frame

Type

Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if
endogeneity was addressed in methods)

A

Firms required to increase audit committee independence
had a greater decrease in information asymmetry. (e)

RD, Agency,
Institutional

A

Agency

A

Audit committee member turnover was 70% more likely
following restatements. Stock market reaction to
restatements and external prompting for restatements were
not found to increase the likelihood of audit committee
member turnover.
Institutional lead plaintiff leads to greater independence of
the audit committee. (e)

Cheng, Huang, Li,
and Lobo, 2010;
JFE
Del Guercio, Seery,
and
Woidtke, 2008; JFE
Duchin, Matsusaka
and Ozbas, 2010;
JFE

C
A, C,
N

Ertimur, Ferri, and
Maber, 2012; JFE

A, C

Linck, Netter, and
Yang, 2008; RFS

A, N

Laing and
Weir, 1999; MD

All

54 activist campaigns identified in which the proponent
requests one or more specific and measurable actions, such
as removing the CEO from the compensation committee.
From 1998 to 2005, percentage of independent directors
rose on audit committees from 81 to 95% on audit
committees, 72 to 92% on nominating committees, and 85
to 94% on compensation committees. (e)
Audit committee members penalized via fewer votes when
up for re‐election when backdating has occurred, but less
than compensation committee members. For firms involved
in backdating, significant penalties (votes withheld when up
for re‐election) accrued to compensation committee
members, particularly those who served during backdating
period.
After SOX, audit and nominating committee members met
more often, some firms increased audit committee chair and
member compensation, and director turnover increased
substantially – particularly for audit committee members.
U.K. firms, especially larger ones, followed the Cadbury
Committee's recommendation that they employ a board
committee structure, but there is little evidence that this
positively impacted firm performance. (United Kingdom)

Srinivasan, 2005;
JAR

Efficient labour
A
markets, Agency

Valenti, 2008; JBE

Agency, RD

A, N

Governance
characteristics
Anderson and
Reeb, 2004; ASQ

Agency,
Stewardship

N

Cohen, Frazzini,
and Malloy, 2012;
MS

Agency

N

Huang, Lobo, and
Zhou, 2009; CGIR

Substitution

G

Liao and
Hsu, 2013; CGIR

A, C

Shivdasani and
Yermack, 1999;
JOF

Bargaining
power theory of
director
selection

N

Vafeas, 1999; JFE

Contracting,
Agency

All

Self‐
determination

A, C

Director human
capital and
interlocks
Boivie, Graffin, and
Pollock, 2012; AMJ
Cai, Garner, and
Walkling, 2009;
JOF

A, C,
G

High risk of turnover for audit committee members when
there are severe income‐decreasing restatements. The
relationship was weaker for income‐increasing
restatements.
SOX was positively related to audit committee members
who were CPAs or CFOs, but negatively related to CEO
membership on nominating committees.
Founding‐family presence on the nominating committee is
negatively associated with the proportion of directors that
are independent. (e)
Firms with overly sympathetic (i.e., cheerleader) directors
have 29% fewer independent nominating committee
directors, are 30% less likely to be majority independent,
and more likely to have CEO serve on the nominating
committee. (e)
Firms with a larger, more independent and more active
board, higher agency costs, and past occurrence of class‐
action lawsuits are more likely to voluntarily form a
governance committee. Governance committees constrain
managerial opportunism by reducing aggressive financial
reporting. (e)
Common membership among compensation and audit
committee is more likely in firms with weak corporate
governance and lacking financial and committee resources.
Firms with common membership have poorer earnings
quality and weaker pay‐performance sensitivity. (e)
Firms appoint fewer independent outside directors and
more directors with potential conflicts of interest when CEO
serves on the nominating committee or no nominating
committee exists. CEO involvement with director selections
negatively moderates the relationship of independent
director announcements with stock price reactions. (e)
U.K. firms with a greater number of committees have more
board meetings. No relationship found for the number of
committees with firm value. (United Kingdom, e)

Serving as chair of the audit committee reduces the
likelihood of a director exiting the board by 29%, but serving
as compensation committee chair increases the likelihood of
a director exiting the firm by 23%.
Directors serving on the audit, compensation and
governance committees receive fewer retention votes.
Compensation committee members receive fewer votes
when the CEO receives higher abnormal compensation.
Fewer votes for governance committee members increase
the likelihood of poison pill removal. Governance committee

Erkens and
Bonner, 2012; TAR

Ferris,
Jagannathan, and
Pritchard, 2003;
JOF
Field, Lowry, and
Mkrtchyan , 2013;
JFE
Kesner, 1988; AMJ

A, N

Agency

A, C

Director Human
Capital

A, N

Agency, RD

A, C,
N, G,
Ex

Masulis and
Mobbs, 2014; JFE
Director
demography
Bilimoria and
Piderit, 1994; AMJ

A, C,
N

Experience‐ and
gender‐based
biased views

C, Ex,
PA

Peterson and
Philpot, 2007; JBE

RD

All

Zhu, Shen, and
Hillman, 2014; ASQ

SC, Re‐
categorization

A, C,
N, G,
Ex

Institutional

N, G

Interpersonal
attraction, SN

N

Conyon and
Mallin, 1997; CGIR

CEO behavior
Jones, Li, and
Cannella, 2015;
JOM
Stern and
Westphal, 2010;
ASQ

A, C,
N

member vote distribution influences the likelihood of
declassification. (e)
Firm status (i.e., larger, better connected, more admired) is
negatively related to the probability of naming an
accounting financial expert to the audit committee. Social
status is lower for accounting financial experts on board
than other directors.
Directors with more than two appointments participate in
more committee meetings, have more committee
memberships, and chair more committees than directors
with one or two directorships.
Director busyness is positively related to serving on the audit
and nominating committees. (e)
Board members that are outsiders, have business‐related
functional experience and have served longer on the board
are positively associated with major committee
membership. Gender was not related to major board
committee membership.
Major committee membership is associated with
significantly fewer absences. Sitting on more prestigious
boards is positively related to being a member of the audit
or compensation committee. (e)
Men were preferred for membership on compensation and
executive committees, while women were preferred for
public affairs committees.
While there are few women on the boards of UK firms, their
membership on key board committees is even lower.
(United Kingdom, e)
Women more likely to sit on public‐affairs committee and
less likely to sit on executive committee. No relationship
found between gender and sitting on nominating,
compensation, finance and audit committees.
Similarity to committee members positively related to
likelihood of being appointed as major committee member
or chair. Incumbents' prior experience with demographically
different directors is positively related to likelihood of being
appointed chair of a major committee.
CEOs more powerful than the board are more likely to avoid
adoption of a governance committee. Firms with a
nominating committee adopted governance committees
faster. Prior service on any committee positively related to
serving on inaugural governance committee. (e)
Increased likelihood of manager or outside director receiving
a board appointment when they exhibit ingratiating
behaviour towards a CEO or director on the nominating
committee.

Westphal and
Bednar, 2008; ASQ

Interpersonal
Influence, Social
Influence

N

CEO ingratiating behaviour and persuasion attempts are
negatively related to creation of a nominating committee.
CEO persuasion attempts with institutional investors
negatively moderate the relationship between institutional
ownership and the creation of independent nominating
committee. (e)
For Theoretical Frame: (RD) Resource Dependence Theory, (SC) Social Comparison Theory, (SN) Social
Networking Theory.
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (C) Compensation, (Ex) Executive, (G)
Governance, (N) Nominating, (PA) Public Affairs.

Table 4. Outcomes: Firm performance and value
Authors, Year; Journal
Committee independence
affecting firm performance and
value
Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and
Matos, 2011; JFE

Theoretical
frame

Type

Key findings (Country, if not solely United
States; e, if endogeneity was addressed in
methods)

Agency

A

Audit committee independence is positively
related to firm performance. (Canada, United
Kingdom, United States, Australia; e)
Audit committee independence is associated
with higher firm value. (Canada, United Kingdom,
United States, Australia, e)
CEO and other insider membership on
nominating committee is positively related to
market return. Number of nominating
committee meetings is negatively related to
market return. Delegating nominating
responsibility to another committee with CEO
involvement is positively related to market
return. Percentage of outside CEOs on
nominating committee is negatively related to
market return.
Presence of expert, independent directors on the
audit committee enhances firm value. (e)
With new rules for committee independence,
firms with fewer independent committees have
higher abnormal stock returns. Effect greatest
for medium/large firms, with less abnormal
returns for small firms without independence,
suggesting independence requirements impose
significant costs on small firms.
Affiliated directors on the audit committee are
positively related to pre‐packaged bankruptcy
filings and negatively related to time spent in
reorganization.
Nominating committee independence negatively
related to firm value, positively related to
director turnover, and positively moderates

Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and
Williamson, 2008; RFS

A

Callahan, Millar, and
Schulman, 2003; JCF

Bargaining
power theory
of director
selection

N

Chan and Li, 2008; CGIR

Agency

A

Chhaochharia and
Grinstein, 2007; JOF

A, C,
N

Daily, 1996; SMJ

Agency, RD

A

Faleye, 2007; JFE

Agency

N

Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, and
Xu, 2011; CGIR

Agency

A, C

Hoechle, Schmid, Walter, and
Yermack, 2012; JFE

Agency

N

Klein, 1998; JLE

Agency, FR

C

Klein, 2002b; TAR

Agency, TCE

A

Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010; JFE

Agency

A, N

Platt and Platt, 2012; JBR

Agency, RD,
Stewardship

A, C,
N

Agency

A

Director expertise affecting firm
performance and value
Davidson, Xie, and Xu, 2004;
JAPP

DeFond, Hann, and Hu, 2005;
JAR

A

Interlocks affecting firm
performance and value
Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; JFE

Kang, 2008; AMJ

A

Signalling,
Attribution

A, G

impact of shareholder wealth changes on CEO
compensation. (e)
Weak evidence of a negative association of
affiliated committees with financial performance
in the period leading to the financial crisis. (e)
An independent nominating committee is
negatively related to excess firm value and
positively related to cumulative abnormal
returns from a diversifying acquisition.
Diversified firms are less likely to have an
independent nominating committee. (e)
Percentage of outside directors on the
compensation committee is negatively related to
productivity. The market reacts positively to the
announcement of an increased percentage of
outside directors on the compensation
committee. (e)
Audit committee independence is positively
related to board size and independence and
negatively related to firm growth and financial
performance. (e)
The death of an independent member of the
audit or nominating committee is negatively
associated with abnormal negative returns. (e)
Major committee's size and percentage of
independent directors positively related and
percentage of grey directors on the audit and
compensation committee negatively related to
firm avoiding bankruptcy.
Newly announced audit committee members
with experience in financial oversight, employed
by a CPA firm, or working as an audit consultant
are positively associated with cumulative
abnormal returns.
Naming an accounting financial expert to the
audit committee is positively related to market
reaction; this relationship is positively
moderated by strong governance.
Investor reactions at interlocked firms are more
negative if a director being sued serves on the
interlocked firm's audit committee. Outside
directors are more likely to lose other board
appointments when the outside director sits on
the audit committee of the interlocked firm.
Reputational penalties, measured as cumulative
abnormal returns, are associated with

Committee
characteristics/composition
affecting firm performance and
value
Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, and
Simpson (2010); CGIR

interlocked board members serving as audit chair
of an accused or associated firm and for an
interlocked board member being the governance
committee chair of the associated, but not the
accused, firm.

RD, Human
Capital, Agency

A, C,
N

No significant relationship found between the
gender or ethnic diversity of important board
committees and financial performance for a
sample of major US corporations. (e)
Dey, 2008; JAR
Agency
A
Audit committee effectiveness is positively
related to the level of agency conflicts and to
financial and market performance for all levels of
agency within firms. (e)
Fich, Cai, and Tran, 2011; JFE
Agency
C
A busy compensation committee leads to more
rent extraction in target firms. CEOs of target
firms get more options and shareholders suffer
more value loss. (e)
Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and
Agency
A, C, CEO or a director's death at firm A makes other
Lel, 2014; JFE
N
interlocked directors on major committees of
firm B busier and this results in lower cumulative
abnormal returns. Results are stronger for the
audit committee. (e)
Faleye, Hoitash, and
Agency
A, C, Independent directors serving on at least 2 of the
Hoitash, 2011; JFE
N
3 monitoring committees improve board's
monitoring quality (e.g., increased sensitivity of
turnover to firm performance, less discretionary
accruals, reduced excess compensation). Yet,
improved monitoring jeopardizes board advising
quality and results in lower acquisition
performance and lower innovation. In firms with
high advising needs, weaknesses in board
advising outweigh the benefits of intense
monitoring and lead to reduction in firm value.
(e)
Gerety, Hoi, and Robin, 2001;
Agency
N
Relationship of stock market reaction to
FM
proposals of incentive plans for board members
is negatively moderated by the CEO being on or
the firm not having a nominating committee.
Yermack, 1997; JOF
C
Firms receive lower cumulative abnormal returns
following option awards when the compensation
committee includes a non‐executive board chair
or an outside blockholder. CEOs can change the
timing of stock option grants by influencing the
timing of the compensation meeting.
For Theoretical Frame: (FR) Free Rider, (RD) Resource Dependence Theory, (TCE) Transaction Cost Economics.

Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (C) Compensation, (G) Governance, (N)
Nominating.

Table 5. Outcomes: Executive compensation
Authors, Year; Journal
Committee
independence
Capezio, Shields, and
O'Donnell, 2011; JMS

Theoretical
frame

Type Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if
endogeneity was addressed in methods)

Agency, MP,
Behavioural
Agency

C

Chhaochharia and
Grinstein, 2009; JOF

Chowdhury and
Wang, 2009; JOM

C, N

Salience,
Agency

Conyon and
Peck, 1998; AMJ

Daily, Johnson,
Ellstrand, and
Dalton, 1998; AMJ
Ferrell, Liang, and
Renneboog, 2016; JFE

C

C, N

Agency, SC,
Institutional,
Stewardship
Agency

C
C

Focke, Maug, and
Niessen‐Ruenzi, 2017;
JFE
Guthrie, Sokolowsky,
and Wan, 2012; JOF
Hwang and Kim, 2009; Agency
JFE

C

Main and
Johnston, 1993; ABR

C

Agency,
Anchoring

C, N
A

Non‐executive members on Australian firms’ compensation
committees positively associated with non‐incentive CEO
pay, but no relationship found between compensation
committee independence and CEO incentive pay and total
pay. (Australia, e)
Following the passage of SOX, firms previously
noncompliant with new requirements have a 17%
reduction in compensation associated with board
independence. No effect found for nominating and
compensation committee independence with CEO
compensation. (e)
Compensation committee independence positively
moderates the relationship of non‐proxy‐based activism
with the portion of Canadian CEOs’ compensation that is
contingent. No significant interaction found for
compensation committee independence and proxy‐based
activism. (Canada)
Outside directors on the remuneration committee of UK
firms positively influenced the relationship of top
management pay with corporate performance. Outside
directors on the nominating committee did not influence
the pay‐for‐performance relationship. (United Kingdom)
Affiliated or interdependent directors were not found to
change the level, or the mix of types, of compensation.
For worldwide firms, including non‐investment trust firms
in the FTSE250, independent compensation committee
negatively related to CEO total compensation. Excessive
CEO pay negatively related to corporate social
responsibility. (Canada, United Kingdom, United States,
Australia, e)
The effect of a firm's prestige on CEO compensation is
stronger in firms with independent compensation
committees. (e)
Requirements for compensation committee independence
increased CEO and non‐CEO executive compensation.
CEOs whose audit committees are conventionally
independent, but socially linked to the CEO, receive larger
bonuses than equivalent CEOs whose audit committees are
conventionally and socially independent.
Presence of a compensation committee in UK firms
positively associated with CEO pay, but not associated with
the incentive structure of pay. (United Kingdom)

Masulis, Wang and
Xie, 2012; JAE

Agency

A, C

Foreign independent directors on audit committees are
positively associated with restatements. Foreign
independent director on compensation committee are
associated with higher CEO compensation and a lower
percentage of equity‐based CEO compensation. (e)

sc, sn

C

Brandes, Dharwadkar,
and Suh, 2016; SMJ

Agency, UE

A, C

Conyon and He, 2004;
JMAR

Agency, MP,
SOC

C

Grinstein and
Hribar, 2004; JFE
Stathopoulos,
Espenlaub, and
Walker, 2004; JMAR

Agency, MP

N

Agency, MP,
Perceived Cost

C

Young and
Buchholtz, 2002; JMI

Agency,
Stewardship,
Social Identity

C

Compensation committee chair status associated with
reduced CEO compensation. CEOs with higher social status
than the compensation committee chair receive 16%
higher pay. CEOs paired with a low‐status compensation
committee chair receive higher pay than CEOs paired with
a high‐status chairs.
Member overlap among compensation and audit
committees suppresses total compensation and is
positively associated with salary, but not equity, as a
proportion of total compensation. Committee overlap
negatively associated with total compensation and
positively associated with CEO salary. Committee overlap
has a stronger negative effect on total and equity based
compensation when less conservative accounting practices
are followed. (e)
Venture capitalists on compensation committee and
committee member pay negatively associated and
blockholders positively associated with equity incentives.
Compensation committee member pay positively
associated with CEO compensation. No support for
managerial power model determinants with CEO
compensation and equity.
CEO on the nominating committee associated with greater
CEO bonus pay. (e)
Other executives on UK compensation committees
negatively associated with non‐executive salary plus bonus
and positively associated with non‐executive total pay. CEO
or only non‐executives on compensation committee
positively associated with CEO total pay. CEO on
compensation committee negatively associated with other
executives’ long term pay. (United Kingdom)
Age dissimilarity between compensation committee
members and the CEO positively related to CEO total
compensation change. Relationship negatively moderated
by firm performance. Firm performance positively
moderates relationship between tenure dissimilarity and
change in total CEO compensation.

UE

C

Agency, UE

C

Committee
composition
Belliveau, O'Reilly,
and Wade, 1996; AMJ

Political orientation
Chin and
Semadeni, 2017; SMJ
Gupta and
Wowak, 2017; ASQ

The liberalism of the compensation committee strengthens
the positive relationship between CEO liberalism and TMT
horizontal pay equality. (e)
Compensation committee political conservatism is
positively related to CEO pay. Financial performance

Committee
characteristics
Cyert, Kang, and
Kumar, 2002; MS

positively moderates the relationship of compensation
committee conservatism and CEO pay. (e)
Agency, MP,
Options

Persons, 2006; JBE

C

C

Sun and Cahan, 2009;
CGIR

Agency

C

Tosi and Gomez‐
Mejia, 1989; ASQ

Agency

C

Committee anchoring
Adut, Cready, and
Lopez, 2003; TAR

C

Bizjak, Lemmon, and
Naveen, 2008; JFE
Ezzamel and
Watson, 2002; JMS

C
Equity, SC

Faulkender and
Yang, 2010; JFE

C

C

Fich, Starks, and
Yore, 2014; JFE

Agency

C

O'Reilly, Main, and
Crystal, 1988; ASQ

SC, Anchoring,
Tournament

C

Compensation committee members’ stock ownership in
company negatively related to CEO base salary, equity
compensation, and discretionary compensation.
Compensation committee members’ stock ownership
negatively associated with CEO discretionary compensation
in small, but not large, firms.
No reduction in compensation for firms with fraud or
lawsuits if there is a larger compensation committee.
Compensation committee characteristics not associated
with CEO dismissal if there is fraud or lawsuit.
CEO current compensation more positively associated with
accounting earnings when firms have higher compensation
committee quality. Positive effect of compensation
committee quality on the association between CEO current
compensation and accounting earnings is less in high
growth or loss‐making firms. (e)
Monitoring of CEO pay is positively related to
compensation committee influence in both management
and owner controlled firms.
Compensation committees intervene to modify the firm's
net income used to determine CEO compensation when
there are reported restructurings; The extent of the
intervention is dependent on the frequency of the
restructurings and CEO tenure.
Boards use various criteria (e.g., referencing peer firms,
firm size, relative performance) to determine CEO
compensation structure.
UK compensation committees adjust CEO pay in line with
anticipated market rates, rather than being consistent with
pay changes for other committee members. (United
Kingdom)
Compensation committees seem to endorse compensation
peer groups that include unrelated firms, possibly because
such firms would potentially ratchet up the level of pay for
the CEOs
Deal‐making firms’ boards are significantly less likely than
non‐deal‐making boards to cite financial performance
measures as justification for increasing CEO pay and to
mention growth as a rationale for compensation decisions.
However, deal‐making boards are more likely to rely upon
measures of CEO non‐financial performance to justify pay
raises. (e)
Strong support for social comparison and anchoring
theories, with compensation committee member pay

associated with CEO compensation. No support for
tournament theory in predicting CEO compensation.
Perry and
C
Compensation committees consider the regulatory
Zenner, 2001; JFE
environment when making CEO compensation decisions.
For Theoretical Frame: (MP) Managerial Power Theory, (SC) Social Comparison Theory, (SN) Social Networking
Theory, (SOC) Standard Optimal Contracting Theory, (UE) Upper Echelons Theory.
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (C) Compensation, (N) Nominating.

Table 6. Outcomes: Misconduct and inappropriate behavior
Authors, Year; Journal
Committee
independence
Bebchuk, Grinstein, and
Peyer, 2010; JOF

Bedard, Chtourou, and
Courteau, 2004; AJPT

Theoretical
frame

Agency

Brochet and
Srinivasan, 2014; JFE
Bruynseels and
Cardinaels, 2013; TAR

Type

Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if
endogeneity was addressed in methods)

C

An independent compensation committee alone does not
reduce likelihood of the receipt of lucky stock option grants.
However, the presence of at least one large blockholder on
an independent compensation committee reduces the
likelihood of opportunistic timing of option grants by 71%.
Financial expertise constrain aggressive earnings
management. Strong negative relationship for audit
committee member independence with excluding stock
options from compensation and aggressive earnings
management. No relationship found for audit committee
activity and earnings management. (e)
Independent directors on the audit committee have a
greater likelihood of being named a defendant in a class
action lawsuit than directors not on the audit committee. (e)
Audit committees with friendship‐related social network ties
to the CEO purchase fewer audit services, engage in more
earnings management, and are less likely to issue going‐
concern opinions or report internal control weaknesses.
Social ties between audit committee members and CEOs that
were formed from advice networks do not influence the
quality of audit committee oversight. (e)
Percentage of insiders on compensation committee
negatively related to option repricing and is a more
important predictor than percentage of insiders on the full
board or insider stock ownership. Presence of a blockholder
on the compensation committee reduces likelihood of
repricing, while the presence of a nonexecutive chairman on
the compensation committee increases likelihood of
repricing.
A greater percentage of affiliated directors on the audit
committee reduces the likelihood of the firm's auditor
issuing a going‐concern report.
Ratio of insiders on compensation committee positively
related to firm not having an ethics program.
Audit committees with less than 50% independent directors
associated with larger adjusted abnormal accruals.
Movement to a minority‐independent audit committee

A

A
Agency, SN

Callaghan, Saly, and
Subramaniam, 2004;
JOF

A

C

Carcello and
Neal, 2000; TAR

Agency

A

Felo, 2001; JBE

Agency

C

Klein, 2002a; TAR

Agency

A

Krishnan, 2005; TAR

Agency

Larcker, Richardson,
and Tuna, 2007; TAR

A
A

Schnatterly, 2003; SMJ

Agency

A

Uzun, Szewczyk, and
Varma, 2004; FAJ

Agency

A, C,
N

Agency

A

SN

A, C,
N

Committee
composition
Beasley, 1996; TAR

Cao, Dhaliwal, Li, and
Yang, 2014; MS
DeFond and
Jiambalvo, 1991; TAR
Naiker and
Sharma, 2009; TAR

A
Revolving
Door

A

Committee
characteristics
Ndofor, Wesley, and
Priem, 2015; JOM

Agency,
Complexity

A

associated with large increases in adjusted abnormal
accruals. (e)
Audit committee independence and financial expertise on
the audit committee negatively associated with internal
control problems.
No relationships between affiliated directors on the audit
committee and number of audit committee meetings with
abnormal accruals, earnings restatements, and future
performance. (e)
Greater levels of audit committee independence and
meetings are not related to the likelihood of a first crime, but
may help prevent subsequent crimes.
The presence of an audit committee was negatively
associated with fraud, but presence of a compensation
committee and grey directors on major committees was
positively associated with fraud.
Outside director ratio associated with lower financial
statement fraud. Audit committee presence (pre‐SOX) and
its interaction with the ratio of outside directors not
associated with financial statement fraud.
Directors on the nominating or compensation committee
receive higher than average returns from stock purchases
than other directors, while there is no such advantage for
directors on the audit committee. (e)
Presence of an audit committee (pre‐SOX) negatively
associated with overstated earnings.
Former audit partners on the audit committee, regardless of
affiliation with the firm's current auditor, are negatively
related to the reporting of internal control deficiencies. (e)

The relationship of industry and firm complexity with
fraudulent reporting is negatively moderated by more
stringent audit committee monitoring. (e)
Badolato, Donelson,
Agency
A
Audit committees with higher status and financial expertise
and Ege, 2014; JAE
are associated with lower accounting irregularities and
abnormal accruals. (e)
Chan, Chen, Chen, and
A
There is a positive relationship between audit committee size
Yu, 2012; JAE
and clawback adoption.
Farber, 2005; TAR
Agency
A
Fraudulent firms associated with fewer audit committee
meetings and financial experts on audit committee. Firms
adjusting governance to findings of fraud have more audit
committee meetings.
Keune and
ED, ARP
A
Negative relationship found for audit committees with
Johnstone, 2012; TAR
greater financial expertise with likelihood of waiving material
misstatements.
For Theoretical Frame: (ARP) Auditor Reputation Protection, (ED) Economic Dependence, (SN) Social Networking
Theory.

Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (C) Compensation, (N) Nominating.

Table 7. Outcomes: Accounting practices
Authors, Year;
Journal
Committee
independence
Abbott et
al., 2004; AJPT
Abbott et
al., 2003; AJPT
Carcello and
Neal, 2003: TAR

Theoretical
frame

Type Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if
endogeneity was addressed in methods)
A
A

Agency

A

Agency

A

RD

A

Gaynor et
al., 2006; TAR

Agency

A

Hoitash et
al., 2009; TAR

Agency

A

Knapp, 1987; TAR

Exchange

A

Karamanou and
Vafeas, 2005; JAR

Committee
composition
Cohen et
al., 2013; TAR

Naiker et
al. 2012; TAR

A

Venkataraman, et
al. 2008; TAR
Committee
characteristics
Abbott et al.
, 2007; TAR

A

A

Likelihood of restatement is less for firms with fully independent
and more active audit committees who include a financial
expert. (e)
Audit committee independence and inclusion of financial
expertise are positively associated with audit fees. (e)
Audit committee independence, governance expertise and
member stock ownership positively related retaining an auditor
after issuance of an unfavourable report. Auditor dismissal
positively related to subsequent audit committee member
turnover.
Managers in firms with more effective audit committee
structures (e.g., higher ratio of independent members, larger
size, more frequent meetings, and higher ratio of financial
experts) more likely to make or update earnings forecasts.
Forecasts in firms with more effective audit committee
structures likely to have less precise, but more accurate
forecasts, and more likely to result in a positive market reaction.
Audit committees with more members who are both accounting
and industry experts perform better than audit committees with
just accounting experts, or, in some cases, audit committees
with only financial supervisory expertise. (e)
Audit committee members more likely to have joint provision
preferences similar to investors if audit quality improves and
more reluctant than investors to recommend joint provisions
when public disclosures are required.
Number of audit committee meetings, but not audit committee
size, positively associated with material weaknesses disclosed.
(e)
Audit committee members more likely to support auditors,
instead of management, during audit disputes. Audit committee
member less likely to support the auditor when disputes were
not related to technical standards or when the firm is in a strong
financial position.
Former audit firm partners, regardless of affiliation, on the audit
committee reduce non‐audit services purchased from the
auditor.
In pre‐IPO situations, the presence of an audit committee is
negatively associated with accruals.
Firms with effective audit committees less likely to outsource
routine internal auditing to an external auditor, while no such

relationship was found for outsourcing non‐routine audit
activity.
Agoglia et al2011;
A
The relationship between the CFO applying a more precise
TAR
standard with the likelihood of aggressive financial reporting
was negatively moderated by audit committee strength.
Beck and
Power, Agency A
More powerful audit committees were associated with smaller
Maudlin, 2014;
audit fee reductions, while more powerful CFOs were associated
TAR
with larger audit fee reductions. (e)
Engel et al. 2010; Agency,
A
Audit committee members' total compensation and cash
JAE
Managerial
retainers were positively associated with the demand for
Productivity
monitoring. (e)
Kalbers and
Agency,
A
Level of inside director ownership negatively associated with
Fogarty, 1998;
Institutional
audit committee legitimacy. Outside directors on the board
JMI
positively associated with audit committee legitimacy.
Krishna et
Agency
A
Legal expertise on audit committee positively related to financial
al., 2011; TAR
reporting quality. Positive effects of legal expertise combined
with accounting expertise on the audit committee are greater
after SOX. (e)
Leventis et
A
Banks with effective board and audit committee governance
al., 2013; CGIR
structures recognize larger loan loss provisions on
nonperforming loans compared to banks with ineffective
governance structures. (e)
Magilk et
Agency
A
Audit committee members prefer aggressive financial reporting
al., 2009; TAR
when compensated with current stock and overly conservative
reporting when compensated with future stock. Audit
committee members with no stock‐based compensation are the
most objective.
Seabright et
SE
A
Tenure of the relationships between audit committee members
al., 1992; AMJ
and auditor is negatively associated with the likelihood that the
firm switches auditors.
For Theoretical Frame: (RD) Resource Dependence Theory, (SE) Social Exchange Theory
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit.

Table 8. Outcomes: Other firm‐level outcomes
Authors, Year;
Journal
Anderson et
al., 2004; JAE

Theoretical
frame
Agency

Cheng, 2004;
TAR

Agency

Gomulya and
Boeker., 2016;
SMJ
Guo and
Masulis, 2015;
RFS

Type Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if
endogeneity was addressed in methods)
A
Audit committee independence is associated with lower cost of
debt financing. Audit committee size and number of audit
committee meetings are negatively associated with debt yield
spreads. (e)
C
CEOs may opportunistically reduce R&D spending when they
approach retirement or their firm faces a small earnings decline.
Compensation committees make changes in CEO option
compensation to prevent opportunistic reductions in R&D
spending. (e)
A
Replacement of audit committee members leads to higher
probability of CEO replacement. (e)
N

Noncompliant firms forced to raise board independence or adopt
a fully independent nominating committee significantly increase
their forced CEO turnover sensitivity to performance relative to

compliant firms. Effect of nominating committee independence
stronger when CEO was previously on the committee. Board and
nominating committee independence associated with more
effective CEO monitoring and discipline. (e)
Ng and
Behavioral
A
The availability of guidance from the audit committee has a
Tan, 2003; TAR
Negotiating,
stronger effect on the potential for not meeting analysts’
Exchange
expectations when the audit committee is not effective.
Stevenson and
Agency, Social A, C Serving on the compensation committee associated with greater
Radin, 2009; JMS Capital, SN
influence on overall board decision‐making. No relationship
found for audit committee membership with influence.
Zhang, 2008;
Information
N
Presence of an independent nominating committee at the time
SMJ
Asymmetry
of succession reduces the likelihood of new CEO dismissal. When
outside directors have fewer external directorships, the
likelihood of new CEO dismissal is lower in firms with a
nominating committee.
For Theoretical Frame: (SN) Social Networking Theory.
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (C) Compensation, (N) Nominating.

Table 9. Findings related to less traditional committees
Authors, Year; Journal

Theoretical
frame

Type

Key findings (Country, if not solely United States; e, if
endogeneity was addressed in methods)

Institutional,
Agency

E

Davidson and
Worrell, 2001; B&S

Institutional,
Configurational

E

Eccles et al., 2014; MS

Stakeholder

E

Firms with an environmental committee do not reward
CEOs with environmental strategies more than CEOs
without environmental strategies. (e)
Presence of an environmental committee positively
associated with reduced industry fines. Companies in
‘dirtier’ industries are less likely to have an
environmental board committee.
High sustainability companies are more likely to form
board committees on sustainability
The presence of an ethics, public policy, or corporate
social responsibility committee is not related to
environmental violations.

Environmental and
corporate social
responsibility issues
Berrone and Gomez‐
Mejia, 2009; AMJ

McKendall et al., 1999;
IJOA
Peters and Romi, 2014;
JBE

Stakeholder,
Legitimacy

Walls et al., 2012; SMJ

Agency,
Stakeholder

Presence of non‐
required committees

CSR,
E,
Eth,
PP
A, E

CSR,
E

For environmental committees, presence, size, number
of meetings and expertise of its members positively
associated with likelihood of a greenhouse gas
disclosure. Committee size associated with lower
transparency. Overlap of board members serving on
the audit and environmental committees positively
associated with likelihood of greenhouse gas
disclosure. (e)
Presence of an environmental committee is positively
related to environmental performance.

Beekun et al.,1998; JOM

Agency

SP

Gore et al., 2011; SMJ

Agency

F

Henke, 1986; JBS

SP

Premuroso and
Bhattacharya, 2007;
CGIR
Outcomes from non‐
required committees
Fracassi and Tate, 2012;
JOF

T

The presence of a strategic planning committee is
negatively related to emphasis on financial outcomes
in CEO evaluation. (e)
Presence of a finance committee is negatively
associated with annual CFO equity incentives and the
proportion of compensation comprised of equity. (e)
Presence of a strategic planning committee correlates
with management participation and breadth of
involvement in strategic planning activities.
Firms’ corporate governance ratings and performance
(ROA, ROE, margin) are positively related to voluntary
decisions to form technology committees.

Ex,
PA

Connected directors more likely to serve on the
executive committee. Merger and acquisition activity
more frequent when executive committee contains
connected directors. Firm value decreases more from
connectivity of executive committee members than
from connectivity of board members. (e)
Type indicates which committees were examined in the study: (A) Audit, (Ex) Executive, (CSR) Corporate Social
Responsibility, (E) Environmental, (Eth) Ethics, (F) Finance, (PA) Public Affairs, (PP) Public Policy (SP) Strategic
Planning, (T) Technology.
However, the use of other theoretical perspectives has varied widely across disciplines. In our review, we found
that management has taken the most diverse approach, with agency theory being the chosen framework in
approximately 35 per cent of the studies reviewed in which a theoretical frame was identified. Institutional
theory and, relatedly, social networking theory have been used by management scholars, especially when
examining committee existence and membership. Resource dependence has also been used in management
studies, but to a lesser extent in recent years. Additionally, management scholars have used a variety of other
behavioural theoretical lenses, including social comparison theory and economic perspectives such as human
capital theory.
Finance, in contrast, is even more heavily focused on agency theory; around 75 per cent of board committee
studies in finance stating a theoretical frame used agency theory. Some studies have drawn heavily from other
economic perspectives (e.g., contracting, bargaining power, human capital theory). Still, finance scholars
examining board committees tend to cluster work around basic economic ideas with little influence from
organization theory (e.g., resource dependence, institutional theory) or behavioural decision‐making
frameworks (e.g., equity theory, social comparison theory).
Accounting scholars fall somewhere between management and finance scholars, with agency theory being used
in a little more than 60 per cent of the studies of board committees that stated a theoretical framework. While
accounting scholars have primarily used other economics‐based theories in addition to agency theory, important
accounting studies of board committees have been published using resource dependence and social networking
theory, as well as several other behavioural decision‐making approaches.
In terms of antecedents and outcomes of board committees, accounting scholars dominate published research
on audit committees and how accounting practices are affected by board committee composition and
characteristics, but have shown little interest in how committee members are selected. Management and

finance scholars have shown a substantial and fairly equal focus on firm performance and executive
compensation as major outcomes influenced by board committee characteristics. All three disciplines have been
interested in examining how board committees may affect misconduct or illegal actions by firm managers.

An Agenda for Future Research on Board Committees
Based on our review of board committee research, we identified several areas in which existing research can be
extended or enhanced by using new theoretical perspectives or methodological approaches. In this section, we
provide recommendations by outlining three broad areas for moving board committee research
forward: revisiting established topics with different approaches and theories, studying underexplored
areas, and methodological improvements. An overview of this recommended research agenda is provided in
Figure 2. We first begin by discussing some of the most promising areas for theoretical enhancement, such as
examining the role of director human and social capital and diversity and dynamics among committee members.
While these approaches have been applied at the level of the entire board, they are scarce in board committee
research.

Figure 2 Agenda for future board committee research

Revisiting Established Topics with Different Approaches and Theories
Director human and social capital

Board level research illustrates the importance of directors’ human capital (i.e., knowledge, skills and
experience; Becker, 1994) and social capital (i.e., personal networks with associated reciprocity; Lin, 2017),
though it can be difficult to distinguish between human and social capital (Haynes and Hillman, 2010). Research
suggests that to perform its monitoring and resource provisioning functions appropriately, directors must have
the necessary combination of human and social capital (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Withers et al., 2012). While
these influences are important at the board level (e.g., Johnson et al., 2013), committees exist for distinct
purposes and directors’ human and social capital associated with those purposes may serve an even more
essential role. However, the value of such capital to a committee is likely to be bounded by the nature of
committees’ tasks. For instance, the audit committee requires extensive monitoring by directors to maintain the

independence of the external auditor and examine financial statement accuracy (Carcello et al., 2011). Thus, a
director's accounting skills and financial reporting expertise, combined with prior experience working for or with
an external auditor, contribute to the quality of monitoring by the audit committee. However, other aspects of
human and social capital (e.g., experience in mergers and acquisitions) may be valuable to the board, but would
be of little value to the audit committee.
As such, an avenue for future research is to explore whether director human and social capital transfers to all
committees conditioned on the nature of the committee's purpose. Given the primary monitoring role played by
the audit committee, human capital should have a stronger influence on its effectiveness (Carcello et al., 2011),
something recognized by capital markets when directors with accounting expertise are appointed (Davidson et
al., 2004). At the same time, social capital, particularly ties to executives within the firm, may dampen audit
committee effectiveness by making directors more sympathetic to management and reducing the quality of
oversight. Social capital, however, may be of utmost importance to nominating committees, where directors are
tasked with finding high quality future directors and recruiting them to the board (Eminet and Guedri, 2010). In
the middle, the compensation committee's focus on executive compensation and, in many cases, executive
succession planning, may leverage both human and social capital. On the one hand, the compensation
committee is tasked with limiting managerial opportunism through rent‐seeking, requiring social capital,
experience, and other facets of human capital to identify such behaviour. At the same time, social comparison
theory suggests that social capital might lead to increases in CEO compensation (Belliveau et al., 1996).
As a whole, the value of director capital is likely to be reflected differently at the committee level than it is at the
board level. When monitoring or advice are necessary, human capital is likely to take a prominent role. When
the focus is placed on resource provisioning or accessing external parties, social capital is likely to be more
important. Research can examine whether committees perform better based on the accumulated capital
brought by directors and whether this capital matches the requirements of the committee, as well as the
specific types of capital that influence the committee's effectiveness in accomplishing its purpose.
One final important aspect of committee functioning is the relevance of a director's human or social capital to
the committee. Compared to employed executives, retired executives bring a wealth of knowledge to boards
that is more readily available (Platt and Platt, 2012). As such, retired executives may serve in a more meaningful
manner by being available for counsel. This experience, however, is only valuable to the extent that it is relevant
in the firm's context. While retired executives may be more involved, their contributions may be based on
obsolete knowledge or relationships. For instance, such directors on the compensation committee may make
incomplete social comparisons (see Belliveau et al., 1996). Research could examine the effect of retired
executive directors on committee performance, particularly when potentially obsolete human or social capital
could influence committee effectiveness. Of course, scholars examining this question should acknowledge that
retired executives serving as board members have more available time to serve on committees compared to
other board members.

Diversity and dynamics among committee members and across contexts

In our review, we show that an oft‐studied aspect of board composition is the degree of diversity or dissimilarity
among board members along different dimensions, such as gender, race, or functional background. At the level
of the entire board, scholars have found that different types of director diversity may constrain strategic change
(Goodstein et al., 1994; Tasheva and Hillman, in press), but also increase firm value (Carter et al., 2003) and
performance (Erhardt et al., 2003).
Management research, however, illustrates that differences among directors can become problematic when
they create faultlines between factions due to social categorization processes which yield conflict and cause
disruptions through the creation of schisms among directors (Veltrop et al., 2015). Faultlines exist when there

are categorizations, primarily based on demographics, which might lead directors to group themselves into
smaller subgroups. While faultline research is nascent at the board level, we believe it has important
implications at the committee level for two reasons. First, the effects of faultlines on group performance may be
exacerbated within smaller groups like board committees. Strong faultlines require homogeneity within
subgroups (Lau and Murnighan, 1998), which is unlikely across multiple attributes in larger groups (Hart and Van
Vugt, 2006). Second, board committees are more deeply focused on specific topics, requiring greater attention
and discussion on contentious issues. Deep divides are more likely to breed conflict, which is also enhanced by
faultlines (Thatcher and Patel, 2012). This does not indicate the entire board is immune to conflict, but rather
suggests that such contentious issues (e.g., dismissing a CEO) are less likely to arise on a routine basis.
Exploring committee faultlines is potentially illuminating, since it can highlight mechanisms through which
director diversity may not translate to performance. Boards may not consider director characteristics, traits and
experience when determining committee membership, creating faultlines in committees. Given that faultlines
often lead to conflict and reduced task satisfaction (Thatcher and Patel, 2012), committee faultlines may lead to
member turnover or disengagement in activities particularly critical for the organization, hampering committee
effectiveness. Research might also explore how committee composition changes influence potential faultline
shifts and, subsequently, committee effectiveness. New committee members can be brought on to break up
existing subgroups, replace a departed subgroup member, or reinforce existing subgroups (Thatcher and
Patel, 2012). Changes in committee membership may have a significant influence on the working relationships
among committee members going forward. As boards increase diversity, it is important to understand how
diversity's effects might be leveraged differently at the committee level.
Relatedly, recently published theory associated with boards and corporate governance has predicted that
diversity across individuals (i.e., team diversity) and the ranges of diversity within individuals (i.e., personal
diversity) may be the missing link when attempting to understand the how diversity influences team outcomes
(Tasheva and Hillman, in press). Such arguments suggest that team diversity may be overstated if the overlap of
non‐dominant backgrounds or network ties among team members is not considered (Zhu et al., 2014). However,
Tasheva and Hillman theorize that, within boards, team and personal diversity may act as substitutes or
complements to one another, and that the need for collaboration to fulfil tasks determines whether they act as
such. Integrated with or independent from a study of faultlines in board committees, examining team and
personal diversity not only at the board level, but also at the committee level may bring an entirely new
perspective of when and where diversity provides the most value.

Infusion of new theoretical perspectives

As noted earlier, our review shows committee level research has drawn heavily on agency theory (70 out of 142
studies), with most research emphasizing independence and diligent monitoring. Since director responsibilities
have expanded over time, we believe board committee research needs more extensive application of other
management theories, including resource dependence, upper echelons, and institutional and network theories,
to gain a more detailed picture of a committee's role in governance. Indeed, the virtual disappearance of
insiders on most boards over the last two decades calls into question how to examine independence from an
agency theory approach (more on this point later).
Board‐level research integrating multiple theoretical perspectives has been the catalyst for developing new
board‐level theories (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2018; Hambrick et al., 2015), as well as serving as the foundation for
new findings associated with board membership and the board's monitoring and resource provisioning functions
(e.g., Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2008). Integrating management theories with agency theory may
provide a better understanding of the rationale for appointing certain directors to committees and how those
committees help firms adapt to their environment. For example, are directors more likely to become committee

members due to their monitoring and counselling skills (resource dependence theory), friendship ties to existing
directors (network theory), or individual characteristics (upper echelons perspective)? Furthermore, we envision
scholars utilizing network theory to examine whether committee members use their network status to gain
power and how that power translates into committee decisions. Are higher‐status committee members likely to
exercise their power across all committee decisions or selectively dominate key committee decisions? Do high
status directors influence board appointments, thus further enabling a small network of corporate elites?
As we have argued in the previous pages, we believe that future progress will come through theories that either
complement or compete with agency theory approaches to board committees. Within resource dependence
theory, examining the human and social capital of board committee members will likely yield new insights, but
will also require the understanding and measurement of director experiences, expertise and social connections.
Likewise, we expect group dynamics research to play a stronger role in future studies. Because board
committees are relatively small in size, dysfunctional relationships between several members could have a
disproportionate effect on the committee's performance of its duties.

Studying Underexplored Areas

In the following sections, we provide further suggestions for different topics to be explored within new or
enhanced theoretical frameworks.

Additional predictors of board committee composition

In our review, we discuss research findings on factors influencing committee composition. While director human
capital, independence, demographic characteristics and behaviour predict committee composition, we envision
a greater and more diverse set of predictors. Firm strategic direction, resource requirements, and director social
capital may serve as important predictors of committee membership. One research opportunity is to examine
how restructuring activities, including acquisitions, mergers and divestitures, impact board committee
composition. Since these activities are associated with significant structural and executive changes in the firm
(Haleblian et al., 2009), such changes may also reach board committees. For example, how likely and under what
conditions are a target firm's directors invited to serve on committees in the acquiring firm? Drawing on group
diversity research, we could expect that an acquiring firm's strong culture of inclusiveness (Chatman et al., 1998;
Hopkins and Hopkins, 2002) positively impacts the addition of target firm directors to the acquiring firm's board
committees. An equally important research question relates to understanding how dynamics within committees
are impacted by the addition of target firm directors and how such new members are integrated. We speculate
that the addition of target firm directors could initially yield relational conflict, limiting cohesion (Horwitz and
Horwitz, 2007), but may also bring more diverse perspectives for comprehensive decision making.
In addition, we envision the application of resource dependence and network theory to examine how a
director's experiences, expertise and social ties predict committee membership. For example, we speculate that
current or former members of leading executive compensation consulting firms have strong credentials and are
perceived as highly relevant additions to the compensation committee. Similarly, a current or former CEO who
has led a successful turnaround may be a highly‐sought addition for a newly formed strategic planning
committee, since he or she can enhance a committee's and firm's credibility. Additionally, examining whether
politicians, due to their social connections, fame and experience, are more likely to chair a firm's governance
committee would be thought‐provoking and valuable, as well as shedding light on whether political connections
can bring valuable resources to the board and its committees within various contexts. These research
opportunities can examine matches between committee functions and the skills and resources needed to
perform those functions.
Haynes and Hillman (2010) also found positive effects from directors’ cumulative human capital breadth and
negative effects from cumulative human capital depth on firm outcomes. As board committees have more

focused objectives, future research that extends Haynes and Hillman's work to the committee level could yield
valuable insights regarding the right mix of experience, functional expertise and networking for committees to
meet their objectives.
Finally, prior research has not addressed how director turnover influences committee composition. Given
committees’ small size, the turnover of one member not only changes a committee's configuration, but may also
alter committee dynamics and functioning. For example, if an audit committee member retires from the board,
general and firm‐specific financial knowledge may be lost and the power dynamics within the audit committee
may be dramatically changed. In such cases, does the board prioritize hiring a replacement with similar
functional background and experience, a similar demographic background, a close relationship with the
remaining audit committee members, or a replacement who brings a different skillset and unique expertise and
experience? In a broader sense, research is needed to understand the influence of the nominating committee
and its members on the demographics, skills and experience of new board and committee members.

Focus on less traditional committees

As our review revealed, the bulk of research has been centred on the three major committees, as only 11 of the
142 articles examined less traditional committees. Greater attention can be given to less traditional committees,
examining why they exist and the degree to which they influence various processes and firm outcomes. Given
the rising importance of CSR and increases in shareholder activism, we envision a positive relationship between
CSR‐related shareholder proposals and the formation of CSR committees. Furthermore, this relationship should
be stronger when shareholder activists have greater experience with prior campaigns and when firms exhibit, or
the media reports them as having, CSR violations.
Changes in societal norms or perceptions could be an important driver for the emergence of less traditional
committees. For example, recent revelations of sexual misconduct and harassment might force firms to create
committees responsible for the implementation and enforcement of equal treatment and protection of
employees. We speculate that the announcement of such committees would be perceived positively by the
market only when their purpose is not perceived by stakeholders as impression management.
Board‐level factors are also likely to impact the emergence and purpose of less traditional committees. Using a
finance committee as an example, it would be interesting to test the following competing hypotheses: the
presence of directors with financial expertise is positively associated with the formation of a finance committee
and, alternatively, weak financial expertise on the board is positively associated with the formation of a financial
committee. The first hypothesis argues that greater expertise in a specific function drives formalized structures
associated with that function, while the latter hypothesis argues that formal structure is used to overcome
functional weaknesses.
Because the vast majority of large firms in English common law countries have compensation,
nominating/governance, and audit committees, less traditional committees might offer a fruitful setting for
testing resource dependence versus institutional theory as a driver of committee existence. If a firm's strategy or
industry creates crucial resource contingencies, specialized committees might develop from that dependence.
For example, firms that use a substantial amount of clean water for operations may be more likely to have
environmental board committees. In contrast to such an explanation, environmental committees may be more
likely to be established when the firm's board has interlocks to other firms with environmental committees. This
suggests an institutional theory explanation in which the presence of board committees is motivated by a need
for legitimacy (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Such research could extend to a number of less traditional
board committees.

Interactions between various committees

As shown in our cross‐disciplinary review, most research has examined committees in isolation and overlooked
interactions between committees and their members. One way to increase focus on this topic is to draw on the
idea of complementary versus substitute governance mechanisms (e.g., Misangyi and Acharya, 2014) and
examine if and when different board committees serve as substitutes or complements. For example, what is the
interplay between the nominating and compensation committees and its impact on firm performance? Is it
sufficient to have an independent nominating committee that is responsible for appointing the ‘right’ CEO and
directors to guide the firm? Alternatively, an independent nominating committee may be necessary but not
sufficient, with firms also needing a vigilant compensation committee that complements the nominating
committee and ensures that a new CEO's compensation structure incentivizes value maximization. Furthermore,
recent studies drawing on fuzzy set methodology have shown that performance is influenced simultaneously by
multiple governance factors that operate as complex configurations (e.g., Misangyi and Acharya, 2014). Applying
this logic to committees, scholars need to consider committee characteristics, such as size, composition, tenure,
and expertise, as a configuration when examining their association with firm performance and other outcomes.
Another important committee phenomenon is directors who simultaneously serve on multiple committees.
Such common membership is characterized by complex dynamics and interactions among directors. For
example, Brandes et al. (2016) found that directors serving simultaneously on audit and compensation
committees act as important conduits for knowledge transfer between directors’ monitoring and incentive
alignment duties, leading to lower executive compensation. In contrast, Liao and Hsu (2013) find that common
committee membership can make directors too busy, resulting in poorer earnings quality and reduced CEO pay‐
performance sensitivity. These conflicting results indicate that further research into common membership is
needed to determine whether the benefits of knowledge transfer outweigh the drawbacks of busyness (e.g.,
Ferris et al., 2003). A contingency perspective might bring better understanding to this question. For example,
directors of firms in industries with greater uncertainty and unpredictability could face additional cognitive
pressures that might overwhelm and further distract them, reducing their ability to effectively contribute to
multiple committees.
Further, the characteristics of such directors may influence their effectiveness. Retired directors may have
additional time to devote to the firm, reducing problems associated with busyness. Alternatively, busyness may
be a substantial problem if a director is a sitting CEO of another firm and has membership on multiple
committees. Moreover, overlap might be particularly important for some critical board functions. For instance,
CEO succession planning may be the purview of multiple committees: the nominating committee identifies,
evaluates and hires new directors and ensures they buy into the importance of succession planning, while the
compensation committee provides incentives to attract, develop and retain high potential executives.
Ultimately, committees may have responsibilities geared toward accomplishing a common goal and coordinating
activities among them may be critical to achieving that objective.
Finally, future research on common committee membership could focus on the degree to which committee
interlocks create potentially harmful isomorphism. An influential director serving on multiple committees may
compel each committee to function too similarly or frame issues and potential directions in the same manner.
To the degree that committees help drive the firm forward through in‐depth discussion and a focus on key
issues, interlocks may reduce the firm's ability to adapt and consider alternative directions in a meaningful
fashion.

Interactions of committees with the full corporate board

From our review of the literature, another area with negligible prior research is the interactions between
committees and the full board. A key feature of board committees is their ability to utilize specialized knowledge

and skills (Kesner, 1988), which allows them to perform specific tasks more efficiently and effectively than the
full board. Since committees play an integral and complementary role to the full board, it is important for future
research to provide a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the relationships and interactions
between board committees and the full board.
Expertise and experience deserve further attention, examining the interaction of their specialized nature at the
committee level and their general nature at the board level. For example, how does nominating committee
expertise interact with other directors’ expertise to identify director candidates? While we can expect a positive
relationship between nominating committee social capital and appointing prestigious directors, we speculate
that other directors’ interlocks and network connections (e.g., their social capital) strengthen the relationship.
We believe it is also important to examine fit between structural characteristics, such as independence, of
committees and the full board. While it is logical to expect that committee independence interacts with board
independence to constrain managerial self‐serving behaviour and enhance firm performance, it would be
interesting to examine how committee independence and lack of board independence impact firm performance.
Can committee independence compensate for the lack of overall board independence? If true, such research
can offer a new understanding of the equivocal findings on the effectiveness of board independence on firm
performance (e.g., Dalton et al., 1998). It would also be interesting to examine the interaction of additional
governance mechanisms, such as equity ownership. For example, is the compensation committee's equity
ownership sufficient to constrain CEO total compensation and ensure CEO pay‐performance sensitivity, or does
the compensation committee's equity ownership need to be paired with the full board's equity ownership for
shareholder value maximization?
Finally, the nested structure of committees within corporate boards is associated with directors having multiple
work‐related identities (e.g., Johnson et al., 2006). Audit committee members, for example, associate
themselves with the accounting and finance professions, with the audit committee, and with the firm's board.
Given that identities can shape behaviour and the salience of a particular identity is dependent on the
surrounding context (Ashforth, 2000; Hillman et al., 2008), directors might exhibit different behaviours
dependent on the role that they are currently serving. When a director is performing audit committee functions,
he or she might focus on specific details regarding reporting accuracy (i.e., ‘the trees’). However, in full board
meetings, the same director might stress the importance of long‐range planning and strategy (i.e., ‘the forest’).
How might these multiple identities and potential identity conflicts impact the overall effectiveness of directors
and their contribution to firm value creation? Overall, we believe that utilizing multi‐level analysis for committee
and board research could enhance understanding their complex and multi‐faceted nature and relationships.

Board committees and directors' power

Prior work has also extensively examined committees’ impact on board decision‐making processes and
organizational outcomes. In doing so, scholars have primarily focused on the committee as a level of analysis
and relied on aggregating directors’ characteristics to theorize how and when committees are more likely to
exercise power. While research advances our understanding of committees’ role in governing the firm, it has left
many unanswered questions about the power of committee members.
For example, committee chairs are likely to have greater power than other committee members, as the
committee chair sets its agenda. Therefore, constructs often examined at the committee level, such as human or
social capital through board interlocks, should be examined at the committee chair level. The committee chair's
power may be enough to affect the firm regardless of the other members’ characteristics, rendering other
directors’ capital moot.

Future research could study how directors’ power associated with major committee membership is perceived by
CEOs. Do CEOs try to limit the power of major board committee chairs and, if so, in what ways? One covert
approach to undermine power is to push for the appointment of diverse and conflict‐prone directors who
oppose and disagree with the committee chair, inhibiting committee social integration (see O'Reilly et al., 1989).
Relatedly, what do CEOs do when they disagree with a major committee's decision? While, in some cases, CEOs
may adapt to such a decision, they may also seek to control processes, not due to opportunism, but because
they have better information. Additionally, if CEOs anticipate conflicts with a committee and its members, do
they focus on developing relationships with committee members or do they seek ways to place similar or more
supportive directors on that committee?
Furthermore, it would be interesting to examine how director turnover is affected by the power stemming from
committee membership. Do directors on lower‐status and voluntary committees turn over more than directors
on higher‐status, mandatory committees? On one hand, higher‐status committees are more visible, and their
mistakes and ineffective decisions are more likely to lead to external pressure for members to resign (Arthaud‐
Day et al., 2006). On the other hand, higher‐status committees garner more power for members to withstand
such pressure.
Addressing these questions associated with CEO and director power creates a challenge for scholars. Utilizing
established board capital measures, such as functional categories (see Hillman et al., 2000) and measuring
directors’ industry embeddedness, expertise and interlocks (see Haynes and Hillman, 2010), may begin to
address challenges at the committee level. Archival measures of CEO (see Finkelstein, 1992) and director power
(see Westphal and Zajac, 1995) may also be beneficial for examining committee member power. However, if
scholars are going to better understand power in committees, or how CEO power may or may not overcome a
powerful committee chair, we recommend the development of new scales and interview methodologies. We
endorse an updated version of scales developed by Pearce and Zahra (1991) that focus on ethics, process, style
and effectiveness of committees. Scholars would then interview committee members during their available time
when the board is meeting.

A more comprehensive view of independence

The predominance of independent boards post‐SOX may have made research examining board independence
somewhat obsolete (Joseph et al., 2014). However, it has also opened up avenues for new research examining
different director characteristics (Krause et al., 2013). Indeed, the role of independence in committee
composition and function is a rich topic for employing more refined predictors of committee membership with
an emphasis on professional affiliations and social connections.
We found that 34 studies operationalized independence in our review, yet only 13 studies used samples that
spanned pre‐ and post‐SOX enactment in 2002, and only four studies used samples solely after SOX. Studies
using samples prior to SOX often applied simpler measures of independence, such as no relationship with
management (e.g., Callahan et al., 2003) or the majority of directors on the committee having not been
employed by the firm (e.g., Krishnan, 2005). For research utilizing samples partially or fully after SOX, we see
greater consideration of all types of prior and current relationships and affiliations. Bruynseels and Cardinaels
(2013), for instance, considered social network ties between audit committee members and the CEO, finding
that such ties influence the firm's financial reporting behaviour, while Hwang and Kim (2009) utilized an
extensive array of possible social linkages between audit committee members and CEOs in a pre‐ and post‐SOX
sample, finding that CEOs receive larger bonuses when audit committees, despite being conventionally
independent, are socially linked.
Future research that more extensively captures committee members’ expertise and histories, with an emphasis
on past personal and professional relationships, offers the opportunity to bridge social networking and social

exchange theories with agency theory to offer fresh, wide‐ranging insights regarding committee members
meeting their fiduciary duties. Additionally, committee members’ alignment with the current CEO may also
influence their execution of fiduciary duties. Prior research offers evidence that directors without any formal ties
to the firm may refrain from independent decision making due to social and other relational ties with the CEO
(Westphal and Graebner, 2010). We recommend future studies that consider the breadth of social dependence
and how various ties and connections (e.g., joint membership in clubs and associations, graduation from the
same university cohort) influence a committee's ability to perform its duties.
We also encourage a far greater examination of board member longevity and independence. An examination of
interdependence, in which directors are conventionally independent but began serving as director after the CEO
started in his or her position (see Dalton et al., 1998), may improve scholarly understanding of whether CEOs are
able to choose more sympathetic directors and how those directors influence committee outcomes.
Alternatively, long‐serving board members may have a strong familiarity with firm strategies and operations or
may have developed close relationships with firm executives and other board members. Future studies
examining whether committee member longevity and ability to act independently may help scholars resolve
previous ambiguous findings, such as those associated with the relationship of committee independence and
CEO compensation (e.g., Faulkender and Yang, 2010).
Only a handful of studies consider the effects of ownership among committee members on committee
composition and outcomes, with research largely centred on blockholders on committees (e.g., Bebchuk et
al., 2010; Callaghan et al., 2004; Yermack, 1997). Future research could draw from power theories to explore
whether directors with greater equity ownership are more likely to gain influence on certain committees. For
instance, a director who holds more equity may be more likely to become committee chair and, thus, control
the agenda. Exploratory research may even reveal which committees are thought to be most powerful given
which committee seats and chairs are held by powerful directors. Further, scholars may use research on equity
among directors to explore whether the equity concentration of committee members may improve monitoring
among audit committee members or enhance shareholder value creation through executive compensation.
Such findings may build on research by Deutsch et al. (2011) who identified that stock options provided to
directors are more effective in encouraging firm risk than those provided to CEOs. Finally, it may be beneficial to
utilize prior research on the types of institutional investors and blockholders to explore whether differences in
owner preferences influence committee outcomes. For instance, the existence of a transient institutional
investor on the compensation committee may result in a significantly different executive compensation
arrangement than one in which a dedicated institutional investor was appointed to the committee. Such
arrangements may result in greater principal‐principal conflicts.

Methodological Improvements
Endogeneity

Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) asserted that since boards are developed by firms to address potential agency
problems, studies examining boards suffer from endogeneity as the variables of interest are often endogenous.
Additionally, since a director's membership on a committee is not random, the relationships between members’
characteristics and various firm and board outcomes are likely to be endogenous. For example, prior research
has examined how compensation committee members’ diversity, pay, and social status (Belliveau et al., 1996;
Conyon and He, 2004; Conyon and Peck, 2004) impact executive compensation. Yet, directors are appointed to
the compensation committee based on their prior experiences and behaviours (e.g., Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994;
Kesner, 1988). Not accounting for selection bias in committee membership or overlooking the impact of the full
board could raise validity concerns about the effects of directors’ characteristics on executive compensation.
Similarly, scholars examining the formation of committees, especially less traditional ones, may face
endogeneity concerns.

As shown in Tables 3 through 4, we have noted studies in which the research design accounted for endogeneity
in its methodological approach. In our review, only 20 per cent of pre‐2001 studies employed analytical
specifications to deal with endogeneity; however, over 75 per cent of the post‐2010 studies employed such
methods. These findings suggest that methodological rigor today is more commonly employed by scholars and
expected by leading journals. While finance scholars were the first to emphasize and address this issue, it is clear
that such rigor is now considered essential in accounting and management research. Gupta and Wowak (2017),
for example, utilized instrumental variables, Heckman selection models, and fixed‐effects regression to address
reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity. Other scholars have used similar methods to validate that
results have not been influenced by endogenous factors (e.g., Bruyneels and Cardinaels, 2013; Hoitash et
al., 2009). It is imperative that scholars continue to utilize appropriate techniques to alleviate endogeneity
concerns; however, we are encouraged by the increasing attention paid to methodological considerations of
endogeneity.8

Measurement of committee independence

Research primarily operationalizes committee independence as either a continuous variable, measured as the
percentage of independent committee members, or as a dichotomous variable set to 1 when a majority of
members are independent (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 2012) or there is an independent lead director
(Cheng et al., 2010). Given changes in independence requirements following SOX (see Table 2), it is important to
consider how independence is measured. Consistent with our previous recommendation for a more
comprehensive view on independence, we offer four suggestions to scholars which would enable an
examination of committee member independence in line with today's governance climate. First, for committees
in which the traditional measure of independence can still be used, relationships should be explored using a
proportional, rather than dichotomous, measure of independence. Second, alternative measures of social
dependence, capturing an extensive array of connections, are needed to understand if committee members act
independently. Third, the longevity of a committee member, both overall and in relationship to the CEO, should
be used to consider whether the committee member is too bound to firm history or the CEO to act
independently. Lastly, scholars are encouraged to develop more behaviourally‐oriented measures of
independence, including scales that apply survey‐based methodologies.

Alternative sources of data collection

We have a limited understanding of how board committees function and this is mainly due to the exclusive
reliance on archival methods for obtaining data on board committees. While we recognize that it is extremely
difficult to achieve sufficient response rates or access when surveys or qualitative methodologies are employed,
we reaffirm the previous call of Johnson et al. (2013) that scholars examining boards need to gain better access
to executives and board members, since closer and more personal access is essential to understanding how
board committees function. In particular, even limited observation of committee meetings could yield insights
on how committee members interact with each and with the broader board. There is likely to be considerable
variation in the degree to which the full board is informed about the committee's work, and understanding how
these interactions affect not only the committee, but also the board's knowledge and information, could be
beneficial.

Conclusion
Board committee research has been a growing field. However, despite the increased attention from various
disciplines, such as management, finance, and accounting, the literature on board committees has developed
rather independently and with little integration. The purpose of this review was to aggregate existing board
committee research, synthesize the main antecedents to committee formation and membership, and outline
the key outcomes associated with board committees. Based on this review, we identified weaknesses and gaps

in prior research that could be leveraged to generate new and exciting knowledge about board committees.
From these findings, we proposed a series of recommendations for future research. We believe that greater
focus on independence, committee members’ human and social capital, committee diversity and power, and
interactions between various committees could significantly enhance our understanding of board committees’
role in corporate governance. We are hopeful that our review spurs new scholarship related to board
committees, as this is where the real work is accomplished in boards.
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